

Irrational markets, rational fiduciaries



A prelude, courtesy of Irving Fisher

“If we take the history of the
prices of stocks and bonds,
we shall find it chiefly to
consist of a record of
changing estimates of
futurity, due to what is
called chance.”

Irving Fisher, 1906

“The more risky the investment would be to the lone individual playing the game, the safer it is if, by pooling in an investment trust, with

wide diversification in investment, the individual risk is absorbed.”

Irving Fisher, 1928

“This enlightened process
has created a tremendous new market
for securities that in times past would
have gone begging. It constitutes a
permanent reason why this plateau [of
stock prices] will not sink again to the
level of former years except for
extraordinary cause.”

Irving Fisher, 1928

Stock prices have
reached “what
looks like a

**permanently
high plateau.”**

Irving Fisher,
Oct. 15, 1929

The finance revolution



All thanks to a stockbroker he met in a waiting room in 1950

Markowitz's world



Von Neumann



Cowles



Savage



Marschak





Koopmans




Friedman

Markowitz's reading list



The efficient frontier



The Journal of Finance, March 1952

“The calculation of efficient surfaces might possibly be of practical use. Perhaps there are ways, by combining statistical techniques and the judgment of experts, to form **reasonable probability beliefs.**”

Harry Markowitz, 1952

“I still say, my job as an
operations research
guy is, you give me the
estimates, I’ll compute the
portfolios faster than the
next guy.”

Harry Markowitz, 2004

“I said, well, what if
everyone does

what Markowitz says they
should do. What does that
tell us about equilibrium?”

Bill Sharpe, 2004

“Speculative bubbles

have actually arisen in the past.” But they “do not seem to us to be a dominant, or even a fundamental, feature of actual market behavior under uncertainty.”

Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, 1961

The evidence

1. The random walk

“It was a game of

competitive gambling.

In it some were smart and some were not so smart, and the players changed sides so often that it was a picture of financial chaos or bedlam.”

M.F.M. Osborne, 1959

2. Event studies

“Most of the
information
contained in reported
income is anticipated by
the market before the
annual report is
released.”

Ray Ball and Philip Brown,
1968

3. Fund Performance

“... the fact that they are apparently

unable to forecast

returns accurately enough to recover their research and transactions costs is a striking piece of evidence in favor of the strong form of the hypothesis.”

Michael Jensen, 1969

The efficient market

“The ideal is a market in which prices provide **accurate signals** for resource allocation: that is, a market in which ... security prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information. A market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient.’”

Eugene Fama, 1969

“I believe there is no other
proposition in economics
which has more solid
empirical evidence
supporting it than the
Efficient Market Hypothesis.”

Michael Jensen, 1978

“The price is
right! The
price is
right!”

Cliff Smith,
late 1970s

The new finance

index funds

Black-Scholes

Sharpe ratio

alpha

asset allocation

benchmarking

cost-of-capital

shareholder value

risk-free interest rate

modern portfolio
theory

The backlash

The efficient market hypothesis is
“one of the most
remarkable errors
in the history of economic
thought. It is remarkable in the
immediacy of its logical error and
the sweep and implications of its
conclusion.”

Robert Shiller, 1984

“It would surely come as a surprise to the layman to learn that virtually no

mainstream research

in the field of finance in the last decade has attempted to account for the stock market boom of the 1960s or the spectacular decline in real stock prices during the mid-1970s.”

Larry Summers, 1984

“Arbitrage may not be
fully effective
in bringing security prices to
fundamental values,
especially in extreme
circumstances.”

Andrei Shleifer and
Robert Vishny, 1997



"I don't buy stocks simply because others are buying them. I buy them because many, many others are buying them."

The
great
backtrack

“We might
**define an
efficient market**

as one in which price is
within a factor of 2 of
value, i.e., the price is
more than half of value
and less than twice value
... By this definition, I
think almost all markets
are efficient almost all of
the time. ‘Almost all’
means at least 90%.”

Fischer Black, 1985

“It’s conceivable that a change
in the **well-informed**
forecast of future economic
events moved the market as it
did. On the other hand, it’s
pretty weird.”

Bill Sharpe, October 1987

“Fifteen years of
education, three
advanced degrees, and
all you can say is ‘it’s
weird?’”

Bill Sharpe’s mother,
October 1987

“The use of a growing array of **derivatives** and the related application of more-sophisticated methods for measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the enhanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries.”

Alan Greenspan, 2003

“The whole
intellectual edifice
collapsed in the summer of
last year.”

Alan Greenspan, 2008

The
ideas
that
have
held up

1. It's really hard to beat the
market

2. There is a tradeoff between risk
and return

3. There's merit in diversification

The ones
that haven't

1. The price is right

1a. Corporations should do what
financial markets tell them

2. Financial markets are inherently
stable

3. Risk can always be quantified

3a. Risk is equivalent to historical
volatility

3b. Being a “prudent man” means following a few simple rules

Thinking for
ourselves vs.
outsourcing
judgment

1. Index funds work because the fees are low

2. Diversification works when there's a good reason why it should work

3. Investing is always predicting

3a. So understand just what it is
that you're predicting

The fiduciary's dilemma

“It is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, **unconventional** and rash in the eyes of average opinion.”

John Maynard Keynes, 1936